The persistence of restraint, stability and minimalism in India's nuclear policy is best explained with reference to its strategic culture. This constitutes an intermediate structure between the power-acquisition imperative of the structure of the international system and domestic choices on how power is actually constituted. Disaggregation of strategic culture into three analytically distinct componentsthe level of assumptions and beliefs, the operational level and the structural frame -facilitates identification of the precise areas of continuity and change in a dynamic structure. The disjunctures observed, whether at one level or between levels, can then be subjected to social action in the pursuit of peace and stability. An examination of Indian strategic culture with respect to nuclear weapons on the basis of official and non-official preference structures reveals (a) high levels of continuity in the form of restrained responses to external and domestic pressures for change, and in a positive disposition toward arms control; and (b) a significant shift from high to low tolerance of ambiguity resulting from the steady growth of an operational, as opposed to a political, conception of nuclear weapons. The last creates space for nuclear instability. The anomaly can be corrected by exposing the deficiencies in the operational conception of deterrence, thereby reinforcing strategic stability.
Introduction
The series of nuclear tests conducted by India in 1998 and its official adoption of a minimum deterrence doctrine have rekindled the longstanding debate on the hazards and virtues of nuclear proliferation, indeed of the weapons themselves (Feaver, 1995; Hagerty, 1998; Karl, 1996/97; Sagan & Waltz, 1995) . Indians have argued passionately over the shift to overt nuclear status (Basrur, 1998) . Proponents of the policy change claim it has strengthened India's security in an environment of growing nuclear threats (from China and Pakistan) and fostered strategic stability by opening up the possibility of bilateral arms control * I thank Stephen P. Cohen, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Glenn Martin, Shrikant Paranjpe and four anonymous reviewers for their comments. Responses by e-mail are welcome at rmbasrur@hotmail.com. negotiation with nuclear adversaries. Critics counter that India has launched an unaffordable weapons programme that augurs unstable nuclear confrontations, especially with Pakistan. Both sets of arguments have been largely deductive, drawing from opposing assumptions about the essential properties of nuclear weapons and their respective logics.
Below, I address the issue of strategic stability and the thrust of the nuclear programme from a different perspective: that of the effects of strategic culture on nuclear posture. I show that Indian strategic culture accords a limited value to nuclear deterrence as a basis for national security and is hence consistently incremental in its responses to external and internal pressures for substantial policy change. At the theoretical level, I refine and test the concept of strategic culture by journal of PEACE RESEARCH separating its constituent components and subjecting them to empirical analysis. Following a discussion of the concept of strategic culture, I outline a theoretical framework in which strategic culture may be usefully treated as an intermediate structure between system structure and domestic choice. I examine the evidence from the historical record of official preferences expressed through leaders' opinions and state behaviour, and from non-official expert opinion harvested from published works and interviews. I conclude by outlining the strengths and vulnerabilities of Indian strategic culture with respect to nuclear weapons. This will help show how the gradually shifting balance between its political and technical components can be corrected so as to enhance the prospects for stability and peace.
The Concept of Strategic Culture
The 1990s have witnessed a surge of theoretical work in strategic studies drawing upon various facets of the concept of culture: organizational, political, strategic and global (Desch, 1998) . Scholars have attempted either to supplement or, more often, to supplant the realist approach by showing how culture governs the specifics of behaviour, for instance by determining differences in national preferences relating to the use of force. Strategic culture may be defined, in Colin Gray's words, as 'the socially constructed and transmitted assumptions, habits of mind, traditions, and preferred methods of operation -that is, behaviour -that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community ' (1999: 28) . This definition encompasses both habits of mind and habits of practice, with the former conditioning the latter. Viewed as a set of structured preferences, strategic culture at one level entails fundamental understandings about the nature of the strategic environment, the role of force in that environment, perceptions of threat and the framing of responses to perceived threats. At another level, it involves preferences relating to the organization of those responses in terms of the quality and quantity of military forces considered necessary in order to meet national objectives.
The concept of 'strategic culture' has evolved over three generations of theorizing (Johnston, 1995a, b) . The first generation viewed strategic culture as the product of variations in macroenvironmental factors such as historical experience, geography, societal structures and military institutions. It developed concepts such as 'national character' and 'style' to explain putative differences in state behaviour, as between 'weak' democracies like the United States and 'tough' authoritarian regimes like the Soviet Union (Desch, 1998: 146-147). Such differences were also highlighted to stress the risks associated with misunderstanding the adversary (Booth, 1979) . The second generation perceived strategic culture as a hegemonizing tool used by elites to draw support for declaratory strategies masking actual operational strategies. The third and newest generation regards strategic culture not as deeply rooted in distant social and political history, but as the product of recent historical military-strategic experience. This encompasses a variety of concepts and behaviours. For instance, 'national command philosophy' is a 'unified structure of beliefs' that establishes, among other things, the 'preferred attitude toward uncertainty and risk' (Foster, 1992: 74) . 'Military' or 'organisational culture' consists of 'the collectively held beliefs within a particular military organisation' in relation to its internal workings as well as its external environment (Kier, 1995) . A nation's 'political culture', similarly, consists of orientations on a larger scale. In the realm of nuclear strategy, for example, English, French and German policymakers' decisions are said to display distrust of their own peoples and a desire to exercise political volume 38 / number 2 / march 2001 leadership (Heuser, 1998: 260-268 ). In general, there is a stress on norm-driven behaviour, as opposed to the rational calculus emphasized by realists (Katzenstein, 1996) . National proclivities continue to be highlighted, for instance the US preference for low casualty rates, reliance on technical and economic superiority and the belief that force should only be used if there is a clear and visible threat (Becker, 1994) ; or the Chinese preference for the use of force to resolve disputes (Johnston, 1995b) .
First-generation approaches remain popular today. For example, nations are shown to have distinctive 'negotiating styles': the Chinese are subtle, Russians relatively aggressive, Japanese rigid, and so on (Binnendijk, 1987) . Distinctive regional modes of international behaviour have been identified, such as an 'Asian way' and a 'Pacific way', which include a preference for uniquely local forms of conflict resolution without the involvement of external powers (Haas, 1990) . It is evident from the foregoing that the concept is very broad, encompassing a wide range of preferences and behaviours. A central problem is the lack of theoretical rigour in demonstrating the linkage between identified cultural traits and actual behaviour. This is particularly true when societal characteristics are held to be the primary determinants of behaviour.
The latter failing is common in the few studies that have tried to apply the concept to the Indian context. For instance, George Tanham paints a crude portrait of the alleged effects of culture on Indian thinking:
The acceptance of life as a mystery and the inability to manipulate events impedes preparation for the future in all areas of life, including the strategic. The Indian belief in life cycles and repetitions, in particular, limits planning in the Western sense. (Tanham, 1992: 17) Betraying gross ignorance of the material aspects of Indian history and culture, such assertions confuse rather than illuminate.
In like vein, Andrew Latham argues that Indian 'security culture' discourages the acceptance of confidence-building measures (CBMs) because 'such measures operate on a premise that is directly contrary to the Kautilyan paradigm ' (1997: 120) . This is incorrect: India has agreed on a wide range of CBMs with China and Pakistan (Krepon, 1998: 129-210 The structural frame is a conceptual innovation. It has three facets: responses to deterioration in the strategic environment (restraint/precipitateness), tolerance of ambiguity (high/low) and disposition toward arms control (positive/negative). It gives a distinctive quality to the dynamic content of strategic culture.
I define Indian strategic culture in relation to nuclear weapons as nuclear minimalism. Its chief characteristics are (a) a very limited acceptance of the utility of nuclear weapons as a source of national security; (b) a political rather than a technical understanding of nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons do deter, and yet are 'non-useable'); and (c) restrained responses to pressures either to enhance or reduce national nuclear capabilities. Indian nuclear minimalism acknowledges that power (implicitly, nuclear power too) is a prerequisite for security in an anarchic international system. At the same time it considers nuclear weapons both morally unacceptable and detrimental to security because of the risks associated with them. This nuclear minimalism was established at the time of Indian independence (two years after Hiroshima) and crystallized over the next two decades. At the turn of the millennium, it is under some pressure, but its strength belies the warnings of those who stress the risks of arms racing, high spending and risk-proneness allegedly inherent in India's recent decision to 'go nuclear'.
Unlike most earlier formulations, I stress the dynamism of strategic culture. Culture is viewed as a 'collective subjectivity' (Lasuutari, 1995: 25) that is socially constructed and hence constantly subjected to change (Lapid, 1996: 7) . In the normal course, strategic culture changes slowly, which gives it the characteristic of a stable structure analogous to language. Like language, it is at once restrictive in some respects and enabling in others. Thus, Indian strategic culture simultaneously constrains arms racing and facilitates arms control. Because it is dynamic, it is also vulnerable and needs monitoring for corrective social action.
Theoretical Framework and Method
The present analysis does not seek to supplant realism, but to supplement it. In neorealism, structure only induces broad outcomes, leaving room for variations in specific choices within a range of possibilities (Waltz, 1979 As a policymaker, Nehru was faced with a sharper dilemma. His moral instincts recoiled from conceiving of nuclear weapons as usable instruments of state policy because 'we know that the use of these weapons amounts to genocide' (cited in Mullick, 1972: 161) . From a practical standpoint, he acknowledged the value of deterrence in preventing war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but nevertheless worried that 'one accident, one irrational decision, or one wrong move might very well spell an end for everything living' (cited in Ghatate, 1998: 12). Thus, while continually advocating universal nuclear disarmament, Nehru kept the door open for the possible development of nuclear weapons and refused to countenance any agreement that might bring about its closure. Shortly before his death, on a memorandum written by the pro-bomb nuclear scientist, Homi Bhabha, Nehru wrote that nuclear technology offered the 'built-in advantage' of defence use should the need arise (Kapur, 1976: 193-194) .
The ideational and praxological foundations of Indian nuclear minimalism were firmly laid during the Nehru era. For 17 years, consistent with Nehru's beliefs, India's strategic posture was characterized by a suspicion of nuclear weapons, strong advocacy of non-discriminatory arms control and disarmament, and a high tolerance of ambiguity in the form of reliance on an open-door policy to counter potential nuclear threats.
Nehru's successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri (1965-66) responded guardedly to an enhanced threat perception from China, which tested its first nuclear device in 1964. In December 1965, the prime minister approved a secret research programme, the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project (SNEP), to take Indian nuclear capability to a level that would still be three months short of an actual test. Publicly, Shastri resisted strong pressure from within his own Congress Party to embark on a policy of building nuclear capability for military purposes (Subrahmanyam, 1998: 27) . At the time, the non-proliferation regime had yet to acquire teeth in the form of the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). The reluctance to go nuclear clearly came from within.
Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi On the face of it, this was a dramatic policy shift: nuclear deterrence was now officially adopted as a pillar of national security. In fact, the change was less substantial than it might first appear to have been. Its central import is that it was a new declaratory position. Weaponization had already been initiated by Rajiv Gandhi in 1989 (Chengappa, 2000: 332-333). Nor did the practice of deterrence change very much after the 1998 nuclear tests. Apart from conducting a single test of the Agni missile, an extension of an old programme, and setting the NSAB the task of recommending a doctrine, the Indian government did not introduce any change of consequence. Let alone a move to deploy nuclear weapons, there was not even any significant organizational initiative taken as a precursor to the incorporation of nuclear weapons into the defence forces. More than two years after the 'new' policy was adopted, the situation has not changed. On the other hand, initiative for arms control has not been lacking. In February 1999, Vajpayee rode a bus to Lahore in an attempt to break new ground with Pakistan. The Lahore Memorandum committed the two countries to advance notification of missile tests and to negotiation on numerous measures to reduce nuclear risks. The Kargil episode notwithstanding, the first provision continues to be observed. Talks with China were also begun at about the same time.
Quite clearly, there is a high degree of continuity and stability in India's nuclear posture. Neither enhanced threat perception nor change in domestic preference, whether in favour of nuclear weapons (e.g. Vajpayee) or against (e.g. Desai), has brought significant policy change. The strategic culture of nuclear minimalism, established in the initial years after Independence and reinforced by recursive practice, has restrained the response to changes in the internal and external environments of nuclear policy. Change, when it has occurred, has been incremental and cautious. Throughout, the need to deter has been acknowledged within a range from retaining an open door without developing military capability to the adoption of nuclear deterrence without deployment. In short, strategic culture has circumscribed India's nuclear posture in a way that has supplemented and not supplanted realism. Party policy has also had no effect. At one extreme, the BJP has long been a strident advocate of nuclearization, and one would have expected the party to push through a programme of deployment. At the other, the Congress in its early years was staunchly opposed to a clearcut nuclear programme, though some elements within the party favoured it. Actual policy, as already noted, has fallen within a much more restricted spectrum. By and large, neither party has engaged in serious thinking (say, by means of a detailed committee report) over nuclear weapons.
Parliamentary inputs have been insignificant. Though broad political issues relating to nuclear weapons, especially in relation to disarmament, have been extensively discussed, the level of interest in, and knowledge about, the nitty gritty of nuclear weapons and deterrence has been very low (Paranjpe, 1997) . In effect, Parliament has not contributed meaningfully to nuclear policy.
Bureaucratic inputs might be expected to have been substantial because the bureaucracy, particularly the atomic energy establishment, has been a major part of the small circle with access to nuclear policy. Some analysts have argued that a 'strategic enclave' consisting mainly of atomic energy technocrats played a pivotal role in India's nuclearization (Abraham, 1998; Perkovich, 1999 ably, a strategic culture need not contain a coherent set of beliefs. The pushes and pulls of contradictory beliefs (e.g. between prodeterrence thinking and abolitionist thinking) might shape policy (Heuser, 1998) . In the Indian context, though, absolute opposition to deterrence has been too insignificant to affect nuclear policy. I examine two sets of sources. The first consists of six detailed expositions by strategic experts on desirable nuclear strategy. Five are individual sources: Vijai K. Nair (1996) India's security. Surprisingly, less than half of those interviewed echoed this view. A greater number were of the opinion that nuclear weapons are sources of bargaining power.
Analysis It is clear that there are significant areas of consensus in the assumptions and beliefs of the two sets of opinions, but also marked areas of divergence. On the nature of world politics, the realist understanding that world politics is primarily characterized by interstate conflict does not enjoy strong support. The detailed studies do reveal a realist bias, but none gives thought to alternative world-views. Those interviewed were specifically asked about the relative importance of welfare issues, and the majority do not see conflict at the top of a hierarchy of issues in the way that realists do. This accords with the constant refrain in the historical literature that economic preferences set limits to the application of deterrence. All six of the detailed expositions reviewed agree that nuclear weapons are generally providers of security and, specifically, will augment India's security. In contrast, those interviewed are not unanimous that nuclear weapons are sources of security. They also tend to view nuclear weapons as sources of greater bargaining power rather than greater security. Official policy reflects a slow shift over half a century from the Nehruvian perception that nuclear weapons are primarily sources of insecurity to the current opinion that they are central to national security. The significance of this shift is that it has brought the official view closer to that of the experts, on whom the government leans far more than before for policy perspectives on nuclear issues. A restraining effect may be imposed by the more qualified views of the wider strategic elite whose broad expertise is less enmeshed in the technicalities of doctrine.
The overall picture that emerges is that nuclear weapons are viewed with less doubt and suspicion than in the past, though their limitations are acknowledged. They are certainly not privileged as the principal providers of the nation's security, which is widely seen in economic and social terms. 2000) . However, the strength of support for relatively small numbers of weapons (in the below 25 and 25-100 ranges) establishes a restraint on this latter conception, since it indicates an awareness of the immense destructive power of these weapons. There is no sentiment in favour of catching up in numbers or even in quality with China. This indicates a notable predisposition against arms racing. On the other hand, the strong preference for a triad is inconsistent with small numbers, since an element of redundancy in each leg of a triad is considered essential to minimize vulnerability. Thus, notwithstanding the lack of interest in competitive arms racing, the possibility of expanding numbers on the ground of vulnerability remains open.
Operational Preferences
Nuclear weapons are generally regarded as countervalue weapons. There is a widely held understanding that the distinction between counterforce and countervalue targeting is not particularly useful since it is impossible to conceive of a clear threshold between the two. What is truly startling is that nearly half the members of the strategic elite interviewed did not consider nuclear retaliation necessary even in response to a minor nuclear attack. This presents a remarkable picture of restraint in the face of grave provocation.
The Structural Frame of Indian Strategic Culture
The term 'structural frame' is devised to stress the characteristics that set the basic parameters shaping a strategic culture's response to the environment. In the present formulation, it has three components: (2) Tolerance of Ambiguity (High/Low) Nuclear policy has displayed consistently high tolerance of ambiguity. The very fact that nuclear ambivalence (the open door, with no deployment) has been persisted with attests to this. But a change is becoming apparent. Here, it is pertinent to reiterate the distinction between the coexisting political and operational components of deterrence. The first tends to view deterrence as existential and nuclear weapons as essentially unusable. The second tends to conceive of nuclear weapons in usable terms, with characteristics (speed, accuracy, range, reliability, command and control, etc.) akin to those pertaining to conventional weapons. The first tendency is not concerned with numbers and technological sophistication, the second is. In effect, the first is immune to arms racing and nuclear expansionism, the second is not. From the evidence above, it would seem fair to warn of a gradual but unmistakable shift in the structural frame of Indian strategic culture from a strongly political to a more operational character, from one highly tolerant of ambiguity to one with declining tolerance of ambiguity. This reflects, I believe, both the technical imperative of weapons (they stimulate 'practical' thinking) and the pressures of external circumstance (which induced the building of an arsenal). The transformation has been remarkably slow, from the first incremental steps of the 1960s to the beginnings of a bare-bones infrastructure three decades later, but it is unquestionably there. While the risks of instability are reduced by a strong tradition of restraint in thought and practice, it is nevertheless true that the drift toward operationalization carries with it the possibility of diminished restraint as experts become more concerned with numbers, technological sophistication and questions of credibility, vulnerability and reliability. It is noteworthy that these issues occupy a prominent place in the most recent indicator of quasi-official opinion, the DND.
(3) Disposition toward Arms Control (Positive/Negative) Here, there is a reassuring continuity in Indian strategic culture. In the initial years, the entire focus was on global disarmament. By the late 1980s, with the steady transition from latent to actual capabilities in both India and Pakistan, a new area was opened up in the form of nuclear-related arms control: the 1989 Indo-Pakistani agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. This was the natural consequence of a predisposition against large-scale destruction in war, a bias evident from the restrained conduct of all three wars between the two volume 38 / number 2 / march 2001 journal of PEACE RESEARCH more precise location of the strengths and weaknesses of a dynamic structure and permits more effective engagement with that structure in order to propel it in a direction that engenders stability and peace. The present study is confined to a single state. If extended and applied to adversarial dyads in a comparative framework, it can help in the identification of convergences and divergences between strategic cultures. This in turn will facilitate the stabilization of strategic relationships through efforts to consolidate the former and reduce the latter.
The study also provides a theoretical basis for explaining a pattern of continuity and incremental change at the state level of analysis in international politics. Strategic culture, viewed as a dynamic structure that explains consistency of choice over time, need not be regarded as an alternative explanatory framework that displaces neorealist structural analysis. Throughout its history, Indian nuclear strategy (and strategic culture) has retained elements of deterrence -from Nehru's minimal open door to Vajpayee's pronouncements on credible minimum deterrence -and thereby stayed within the neorealist framework that emphasizes states' need to ensure security through the possession of military capability in an anarchic self-help system. In this sense, strategic culture as intermediate structure supplements rather than undermines the neorealist concept of system structure.
